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 This two-part article examines the proliferation, since 
the early 1970s, of sports references in Supreme Court and  
lower court opinions in cases that raise no claim or defense 
concerning sports. Part I, in the Spring issue of Precedent, 
said that careful use of sports references normally strength-
ens written advocacy and judicial opinions by enhancing 
the reader’s understanding, but that the particularly high 
stakes at issue in some cases may make a sports reference 
seem inconsistent with the dignity and decorum that sustain 
the judicial role. Such “high stakes” cases incompatible 
with sports references are few. The example set by the 
Supreme Court itself, where high stakes cases are the norm, 
should encourage thoughtful inclusion of sports references 
in briefs and opinions.
 Part I surveyed the use of sports references in the Su-
preme Court, and began surveying that use in the lower 
courts. The lower-court survey began with football, base-
ball and basketball. Part II now resumes with ice hockey 
and various other sports. Part II concludes by describing 
how sports references, already familiar rhetorical tools in 
the courts, can invigorate written advocacy and judicial 
opinions.
Sports References in Lower Court 
Opinions (Continued)
Ice Hockey
 Since the National Hockey League expanded from six to 
12 teams for the 1967-68 season, ice hockey has assumed 
a more prominent place on the American sports scene.1 
Twenty-four of the NHL’s 30 teams are now based in U.S. 
cities, and a growing percentage of the league’s players are 
now American citizens or veterans of United States colle-
giate teams.2 
 As Chief Justice Roberts demonstrated in Brigham City 
v. Stuart, the decision that opened Part I of this article, 
courts have taken notice of ice hockey. In one case, for ex-
ample, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit noted 
that the trial court’s spectator section was “separated from 
By Douglas E. Abrams the proceedings by a transparent barrier, similar to that in a 
hockey rink.”3 
 In United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the robbery defen-
dant’s contention that the district judge had favored the 
prosecution by interrupting defense counsel more often 
than she interrupted the prosecutor during their respective 
examinations of witnesses.4 The Rodriguez-Rivera panel 
did “not consider this sort of comparison to be any more 
reliable an indicator of a biased judge than the relative 
number of penalties called against each side in a hockey 
game indicates a biased referee.”5
 Lower courts have frequently cited professional hockey’s 
reputation for fighting – conduct that remains outside the 
rules.6 Judges have referenced hockey’s penalty box, a 
small bench adjacent to the playing surface but separate 
from the team’s bench, where an offending player sits as 
punishment for fighting or other rule violations. For ex-
ample, a collateral party or witness may be entitled to an 
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interlocutory appeal rather than have 
to wait in a “judicial penalty box” for 
the main suit to reach final judgment.7 
Discussing particularly weak claims 
made by the plaintiff and his counsel, 
one federal district court expressed 
disappointment that “the law has 
no equivalent of the penalty box in 
hockey, in which a lawyer (or the 
lawyer’s client) could somehow suf-
fer some adverse consequence in the 
litigation game for having committed 
a foul (in this instance, for advancing 
a truly frivolous argument).”8
Golf
 Golf’s Senior Tour and 59-year-old 
Tom Watson’s inspiring run at the 
2009 British Open remind Americans 
that golf is a classic “carryover” or 
“lifetime” sport.9 An estimated 25 
million Americans play golf through-
out adulthood, enabling courts to 
assume readers’ familiarity with the 
sport and its basics.10 
 In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Spokane, the plaintiff 
insurance company contended that 
the alleged negligence of the diocese 
in connection with its priests’ alleged 
sexual abuse was not an “accident” 
under state law, and thus that the 
company had no duty to defend or 
indemnify the diocese under the rel-
evant liability policies.11 The federal 
district court denied the company’s 
summary judgment motion on the 
ground that “[t]he performing of 
intentional acts does not mean that 
every such act that results in injury to 
another is an ‘intentional’ excluded 
act under a comprehensive liability 
insurance policy.”12 
 The Pacific Insurance Co. court 
explained the nuance with an analogy 
to golf: “Clearly, a covered person 
intentionally striking a golf ball with 
the intention that it land on its as-
signed fairway or green, but which 
sharply diverts from its intended 
course and strikes a player on an 
adjacent fairway, does not mean that 
the intended launching of the golf ball 
excludes coverage for any negligence 
involved in failing to warn the adja-
cent players with a time honored (and 
expected) ‘fore!!!.’”13  
 Other golf analogies also appear 
in the case law. Like a golfer who 
readies to play a hole, a party “tees 
up” evidence for the trial court.14 
Performance by a party or counsel 
that meets expectations is “par for 
the course.”15 An ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim fails un-
less the petitioner demonstrates a 
reasonable probability that “had her 
lawyer’s performance been up to 
par, the result of the proceeding . . . 
would have been different.”16 In Enzo 
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Yeda Research & 
Development Co., the plaintiff failed 
to meet the court’s expectations, and 
thus shot a “bogey,” the term for one 
stroke over par on a hole.17 
Soccer  
 Courts sometimes explain concepts 
of fair play with references to soc-
cer, the world’s most popular sport 
and one familiar to Americans from 
World Cup television coverage, pro-
fessional leagues in the United States, 
and vibrant youth league, high school 
and collegiate programs. In Portnoy 
v. Cryo-Cell International, Inc., for 
example, a chief executive officer, 
allegedly knowing that the company’s 
incumbent board lacked votes needed 
for reelection, engaged in delaying 
tactics designed to give the incum-
bents more time to seek votes.18  The 
Delaware Court of Chancery found 
the CEO’s conduct “analogous to a 
corrupted soccer referee, intent on 
adding extra time so that the game 
would end only when her favored 
team had a sure lead.”19 
 In Alton & Southern Railway Co. 
v. Brotherhood of Maintenance Way 
Employees, the federal district court 
expressed concern that undue resort 
to the Railway Labor Act’s dispute 
resolution mechanisms might upset 
the balance reached earlier in the 
parties’ collective bargaining agree-
ment.20  “Any piecemeal alteration 
to this balancing act could result in a 
situation more akin to the unfairness 
of a soccer game played on a hill; one 
team forced to run up and one team 
permitted to run down.”21
 In Niehus v. Liberio, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 
affirmed a damages award against 
police officers for using excessive 
force.22 The court rejected the defen-
dants’ contention that it was physi-
cally impossible for them to have 
kicked the suspect in the left side 
of the face because that side of his 
face was against the floor. “Imagine 
kicking a soccer ball,” Judge Richard 
A. Posner wrote for the panel. “The 
foot goes under the ball. And so with 
a head: a sharp kick to a face lying 
on the floor is quite likely to go under 
the face. . . .”23 
Track and Field
 Track and field – a staple of the 
Summer Olympics and interscholastic 
and intercollegiate programs – fea-
tures various individual and team 
events, several of which have found 
their way into judicial opinions. 
When a person advances a claim, 
takes a position or does an act prema-
turely, for example, the person makes 
a “false start”24 or “jumps the gun,”25 
similar to a runner who leaves the 
starting block before the starting gun 
fires. Two products with markedly 
different capacities are not “function-
WRITING IT RIGHT
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ally equivalent” because “[o]ne surely 
would not argue that a track athlete 
who only runs the 100 yard dash is 
‘functionally equivalent’ to a [10-
event] decathlon competitor because 
the two athletes use the same track 
for their respective 100 yard dash 
races.”26
 In McKnight v. General Motors 
Corp., the federal district judge 
initially limited the length of the 
impending trial.27 Midway through 
the trial, he cut two hours from each 
side’s allotted time for argument. The 
7th Circuit warned that this practice 
threatened to “turn a federal trial into 
a relay race” in which one lawyer 
follows another in the rush toward 
the finish line.28 Other courts have 
compared a party’s responsibilities 
at trial to passing the baton, “a key 
factor in any relay race” because it 
signals the finish of one runner’s lap 
and the beginning of the teammate’s 
lap.29 Dropping the baton, a ground 
for disqualification in a relay race, 
similarly connotes a setback in legal 
proceedings for failure to fulfill a 
responsibility.30
 Field events surfaced in Anderson 
v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.31 
Dissenting from the court’s denial 
of a motion for en banc rehearing, 
Judge Roger L. Gregory of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 
concluded that the unsuccessful 
employment discrimination plaintiffs 
had proved a statistically significant 
disparity.32  By requiring an even 
greater showing, he wrote, the major-
ity “set the bar too high. . . . [W]hat 
was a high jump has now become a 
pole vault that must be accomplished 
without a pole.”33
Boxing
 Professional boxing has appeared 
on television for decades, public at-
tention often focuses on heavyweight 
title bouts, and former heavyweight 
champion Muhammad Ali has been 
one of the world’s most recogniz-
able faces for more than a generation. 
Judges frequently summon basic no-
tions of a “fair fight,” the overarching 
goal in the boxing ring and the court-
room.  In Love v. State, for example, 
the court likened criminal trials to 
“boxing matches, where the state and 
defense trade punches within defined 
rules of engagement.”34 In Barefield 
v. DPIC Cos., the dissenting judge 
argued that by punishing an insurer 
“simply for being adversarial,” the 
majority created a situation “about 
as fair as a boxing match where one 
boxer has a hand tied behind his 
back.”35 
 Courts say that premature claims 
or wasteful pretrial proceedings 
may amount to “shadow boxing,” a 
fighter’s effort to develop stamina by 
boxing an imaginary opponent before 
entering the ring to face the real 
opponent.36 A particularly powerful 
precedent or argument may deliver a 
“knockout punch.”37 It may also in-
flict a “body blow,” a decisive assault 
that inflicts pain on a fighter or ends 
the bout.38 A party suffering rapid, 
successive setbacks takes a “one-two 
punch,” an immediate combination of 
blows designed to inflict maximum 
punishment on a fighter.39 A party un-
able to defend against the opponent’s 
barrage of factual or legal arguments 
may find itself “on the ropes,” the 
disadvantageous position in the ring 
where an opponent can continue to 
deliver blows with little or no oppor-
tunity for effective self-defense or re-
taliation.40 Even worse, the party may 
go “down for the count,” much like 
the boxer who is floored by an oppo-
nent and must rise to his feet before 
the referee finishes the 10-count.41 
 Struggling parties who receive 
a second chance late in court pro-
ceedings, such as by the tolling or 
extension of a deadline, are “saved 
by the bell,” similar to a fighter who 
gets knocked down with less than 10 
seconds remaining in a round, insuf-
ficient time to be counted out by the 
referee.42  Where a party abandons a 
weak argument or voluntarily aban-
dons the trial, the party “throws in 
the towel,” the signal given by the 
handlers of an outmatched or blood-
ied boxer signifying that the referee 
should immediately stop the bout 
and declare the opponent the winner 
before the boxer suffers greater pun-
ishment.43  Where opposing litigants 
present arguments that appear equally 
strong, “the legal and factual issues 
[are] fully duked out to a draw,” 
much like boxers who leave the ring 
without declaration of a victor.44  
 In Akers v. Nicholson, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit denied attorney’s fees and 
expenses under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act, which permits awards to 
“prevailing parties.”45  Because the 
court below had remanded the cases 
for reconsideration, Akers held that 
neither applicant had prevailed.46 “A 
boxer thrown out of the ring and then 
allowed back in to continue the fight 
has not prevailed.”47 
 The court may accuse a party of 
“rope-a-doping” for raising time-
wasting, frivolous claims that in-
duce the opponent to wear itself out 
and deplete its resources in the trial 
court.48  (Rope-a-doping is a boxing 
style popularized by Muhammad Ali 
in his 1974 “Rumble in the Jungle” 
heavyweight title bout against George 
Foreman. A boxer assumes a protect-
ed stance against the ropes, shielding 
his torso and face with his arms and 
hands, and allows the opponent to 
WRITING IT RIGHT
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hit him. The boxer anticipates that the 
opponent carelessly will tire himself 
out and commit errors so the boxer can 
mount an effective counterattack.) 
Wrestling
 For years, televised professional 
wrestling has provided mass public 
entertainment, popular even among 
viewers unfamiliar with interscho-
lastic and intercollegiate wrestling 
programs. Judges have recognized that 
parties and courts often “wrestle” with 
difficult factual and legal questions.49  
Police officers taking turns question-
ing a suspect form a “tag team” similar 
to professional wrestling teams whose 
members take turns grappling with 
opponents.50 A court with an unob-
structed close-up view of a conflict 
between parties has a “ringside seat” 
similar to the expensive seats closest 
to a wrestling or boxing ring.51 A pow-
erful argument may “pin” an opponent 
“to the mat,” enabling the proponent to 
emerge victorious.52  
 In Daniels v. Bursey, the federal dis-
trict court chastised both attorneys for 
their incivility directed at one another 
throughout the trial.53  “Our system of 
justice,” the court lectured, “does not 
work, or at least does not work well, if 
lawyers act like professional wrestlers 
hyping the next match rather than as 
members of the honorable profes-
sion to which they belong.”54  When 
individuals allow anger or spite to 
influence strategy or witness examina-
tion, courts criticize the descent into a 
“no-holds-barred” slugfest, similar to 
the mayhem of an unregulated wres-
tling match.55 
Horse Racing
 Horse racing has been a popu-
lar spectator sport since America’s 
colonial days, and today the racetrack 
and its finish line conjure images of 
a litigant’s quest for final judgment.56  
In Zanesville Metropolitan Housing 
Authority v. Callipare, for example, 
the appellate court rejected the plain-
tiff authority’s effort to change its 
theory of the case for the third time.57 
The court found that the authority 
“changed horses in the middle of the 
trot to judgment,” first “[c]oming out 
of the chute,” then “around the bend,” 
into the “backstretch,” and finally, the 
“homestretch.”58  The court instructed 
that the plaintiff “must ride the same 
horse through all the hurdles of the 
race.”59
 In court, a party will be “put 
through the paces,” much as a jockey 
guides the horse through a race or 
practice run.60  Parties showing a 
strong initial burst of energy charge 
“out of the starting gate,” similar to 
a horse at the beginning of a race.61  
A party with an apparent advantage 
before or during a lawsuit may have 
the “inside track” and a shorter path 
to victory, similar to a horse that has 
a shorter path to the finish line.62  A 
federal court may decline to abstain or 
grant a stay when a pending state court 
action is “neck and neck,” similar to 
two horses that are nearly tied in a 
race toward the finish line.63  When 
narrowly meeting a court deadline, 
a party gets in “just under the wire,” 
similar to a horse that barely beats a 
competitor.64  When suffering a narrow 
defeat in court, a party loses “by a 
nose,” similar to a horse that finishes a 
few inches behind a competitor.65
Gymnastics
 Inviting images of the contortions 
that frequently accompany gymnasts’ 
moves, dozens of lower courts have 
spoken of the interpretive, linguistic or 
mathematical “gymnastics” needed to 
argue or decide a case.66  Other courts 
have emphasized the subjective and 
frequently fact-intensive nature of 
judging in gymnastics; judicial appli-
cation of a discretionary test may be 
“more similar to deciding how many 
points to award a gymnast than decid-
ing whether a football has crossed the 
line.”67
Other Sports
 Since Flood v. Kuhn, judges have 
also paid attention to bowling, figure 
skating, and fencing.  In Joker Club, 
L.L.C. v. Hardin, the plaintiff seek-
ing to open a poker club requested a 
declaratory judgment that poker is a 
lawful game of skill, rather than an 
unlawful game of chance.68  The court 
held that because chance predominates 
over skill, poker is a game of chance 
that depends on the cards that are 
drawn. The panel distinguished poker 
from bowling “where the player’s 
skill determines whether he picks up 
the spare,” that is, whether a bowler 
knocks down all the remaining pins 
with the second roll of the ball.69
 In Connor v. Mid South Insurance 
Agency, the federal district court 
awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees 
of more than $151,000 in an action 
brought under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA).70  
The court rejected the defendants’ 
contention that a lower figure was 
appropriate because the assertedly 
“simple” case did not require the at-
torneys’ customary level of expertise.71 
“Like a world-class figure skater who 
‘effortlessly’ lands triple axels” (a 
particularly difficult jump with 3-1/2 
rotations), “a well-prepared and highly 
skilled attorney can make difficult 
legal problems seem easy.”72    
 A fencer scores only when the 
foil, the light and flexible sword-like 
weapon, strikes an opponent’s torso.  
In State v. Pearson, the Iowa Su-
preme Court upheld the defendant’s 
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conviction for second-degree sexual 
abuse, which required proof of sexual 
contact between him and his 8-year-
old victim.73  The dissenting justice 
argued that sexual contact could 
not occur through layers of clothing 
because  “[t]he contact experienced 
. . . by the fencer touched by the foil 
on his mask is not the type of harm-
ful contact sought to be reached and 
criminalized.”74
Using Sports References 
in Written Advocacy and 
Judicial Opinions
 In the Supreme Court and lower 
courts alike, the  wholehearted 
contemporary embrace of sports 
references dispels any notion that 
sports is out of place in written 
advocacy or judicial opinions. The 
central question now is not whether 
to use a sports reference, but when. 
These references may help advocates 
and judges explain themselves, but 
in relatively few cases might also 
detract from the dignity and prestige 
that sustain the courts. This section 
examines the balance.
 Reasoning-by-analogy is an 
effective tool for orienting readers, 
particularly when the legal writer 
seeks to explain intricate questions of 
law or fact.75 Pacific Insurance Co. v. 
Catholic Bishop of Spokane, discussed 
earlier in this Part II, illustrates the 
point. The case concerned insurance 
coverage arising from serious 
allegations of sexual abuse, and 18 
major law firms filed appearances to 
argue complex issues of causation on 
behalf of the various plaintiffs and the 
defendant insurance companies.  The 
federal district court’s golf analogy 
helped explain intricate insurance law 
issues, not only to lawyers for the 
immediate parties, but likely also to 
lawyers who examine the published 
opinion for precedential value in 
future cases. 
 A sports reference enhances 
communication, however, only when 
the writer uses it in the proper context.  
The federal district court missed the 
point in Booth v. Carrill, which held 
that the Prisoner Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PLRA) did not compel 
dismissal of the state prisoner’s 
federal action.76  The decision turned 
on the act’s “three strikes” provision, 
which requires dismissal of suits by 
incarcerated or detained prisoners 
who have brought three or more 
federal suits previously dismissed as 
“frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to 
state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.”77  The district court held 
that one of prisoner Booth’s prior 
three federal suits did not count as a 
“strike” because it had been dismissed 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.78 
 The Booth district judge accepted 
the magistrate judge’s report, which 
misapplied Chief Justice Roberts’ 
statement that it is the judge’s “job 
to call balls and strikes.”79 Booth’s 
baseball analogy added nothing to 
the reader’s understanding of the 
PLRA because the Chief Justice’s 
statement concerned only his approach 
to judging generally, without any 
application to federal or state “three 
strikes” legislation. At the Senate 
Judiciary Committee confirmation 
hearings on his nomination to become 
Chief Justice, then-Judge Roberts 
assured Senator Arlen Specter that, “I 
come before the committee with no 
agenda. . . . I will confront every case 
with an open mind. I will fully and 
fairly analyze the legal arguments that 
are presented. . . . And I will remember 
that it’s my job to call balls and strikes 
and not to pitch or bat.”80 
 As advocates and judges consider 
whether to use a sports reference in 
its proper context, they write from 
distinct perspectives and address 
distinct audiences. Advocates write 
as representatives of their public or 
private clients; judges write as public 
officers vested with constitutional and 
statutory authority to apply the law 
to decide disputes properly brought 
before them. Written advocacy directly 
addresses the court and opposing 
parties; judicial opinions address a 
potentially broader audience – first 
the parties, and then future courts 
and litigants weighing the precedent, 
academic researchers, and (this invites 
spirited debate) perhaps lay readers 
when the decision touches on matters 
of social concern.81
 In turn, distinct perspectives and 
audiences raise distinct considerations 
for advocates and judges to weigh as 
they consider using a sports reference.
Considerations for 
Advocates: “Make It 
Interesting”  
 An advocate might worry that the 
court would dismiss a brief’s sports 
reference, or even think less of the 
advocate’s argument, for detracting 
from the formality of the proceedings. 
The uninterrupted pattern of the 
courts’ own use of sports references 
in the past generation and more, 
however, leaves little reason for this 
concern.
 “Legal briefs are necessarily 
filled with abstract concepts that are 
difficult to explain,” advises Justice 
Antonin Scalia. “Nothing clarifies 
their meaning as well as examples.”82 
Examples drawn from sports (a 
favorite of the Justices themselves, 
as Part I of this article showed) 
will not win the argument; sports 
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examples, however, can help explain 
the argument by (as Justice Scalia puts 
it) “caus[ing] the serious legal points 
you’re making to be more vivid, more 
lively, and hence more memorable.”83 
 For advocates concerned about 
how the court might react to a sports 
reference, perhaps the tiebreaker is 
the advice that Justice Scalia provides 
brief writers: “Make it interesting.”84
Considerations for 
Judges: Dignity and 
Prestige
 The overarching concern of 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct for maintaining the dignity 
and prestige of judicial office may 
sometimes counsel restraint in the 
use of sports references. The Model 
Code’s Preamble instructs that
“[j]udges should maintain the dignity 
of the judicial office at all
times. . . .,” and Rule 1.3 of the Model 
Code provides that “A judge shall not 
abuse the prestige of judicial office 
to advance the personal or economic 
interests of the judge. . . .”   
 The Model Code does not regulate 
the references a written opinion may 
invoke, but overarching concerns for 
dignity and prestige may invite a court 
to consider whether using a sports 
reference would appear incompatible 
with the solemnity of a particular 
civil or criminal case. On the one 
hand, Part I of this article explained 
that images of sports as mere fun-
and-games incompatible with formal 
writing are misplaced in contemporary 
American culture. On the other hand, 
however, civil actions may implicate 
millions of dollars or sunder intimate 
relationships, serious business indeed 
for parties and the fabric of the law, 
and sometimes arguably too serious 
for allusion to sports where no claim 
or defense concerns sports.  With 
state-imposed loss of life or liberty 
normally in the balance, criminal 
cases may call for even greater 
circumspection. 
 In Cooper v. Taylor in 1996, for 
example, concerns about judicial 
dignity and prestige emerged when the 
sharply divided en banc U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 4th Circuit invoked 
baseball to deny the habeas corpus 
petition of Cooper, who had been 
sentenced to life in prison for murder.85 
The eight-member majority found the 
alleged constitutional error harmless 
because the evidence on record, 
taken as a whole, powerfully and 
overwhelmingly demonstrated guilt.86  
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer wrote that 
“the jury witnessed the government 
score 14 runs with its evidence and 
the defense score none.”87  Judge 
Niemeyer continued that “If . . . we 
were required to invalidate what we 
would expect Cooper to characterize 
as a government grand-slam home run, 
the remaining 10-0 score would still 
have left the jury’s verdict the same.”88
 Dissenting Judge Clyde H. 
Hamilton argued that “because this 
case involves a man who is sentenced 
to life in prison, the majority’s 
analogy to baseball trivializes the 
serious nature of this case.”89  In the 
court’s internal deliberations, the en 
banc majority doubtlessly heard this 
objection before declining to remove 
the analogy from the draft opinion. 
Judge Hamilton evidently lost on his 
objection, but his dissent nonetheless 
countered with a lengthy baseball 
analogy of his own.90
 When carefully used consistent 
with the Model Rules’ overarching 
concern for dignity and prestige, 
sports references can help humanize 
judges, who are sometimes said to lead 
isolated, “monastic” lives once they 
ascend to the bench.91  This lifestyle 
description invites discussion about 
the nature of judging and the role, if 
any, that a judge’s life experiences 
should play when resolving close legal 
questions.92 One need not choose a 
side in this spirited jurisprudential 
debate, however, to acknowledge that 
sports references can help reassure 
litigants, lawyers, and other observers 
that a judge deciding high-stakes 
issues of public or private law has 
followed a cultural path similar to the 
paths followed by legions of other 
Americans in our “sports-minded 
society.”93 
 In the final analysis, the decision 
whether to use a sports reference rests 
with the court’s discretion, exercised 
in light of the judge’s role as a public 
officer sustained by the formality 
that marks the judicial process. It is 
fanciful to suggest that a particular 
opinion’s use of a sports reference 
would affect the outcome, but it is not 
fanciful to suggest that in relatively 
rare cases the reference might appear 
to detract from the professional 
and public esteem on which judges 
and courts depend for institutional 
integrity.  
Conclusion: “The Sports 
Page Records People’s 
Accomplishments”
 The recent generation of Supreme 
Court Justices are not the first mem-
bers of the Court to recognize the 
influence of professional and amateur 
sports on contemporary American 
culture. Chief Justice Earl Warren, for 
example, proudly called himself an 
“ardent fan of most sports” who found 
athletics “an important phase of Amer-
ican life.”94  He particularly loved 
baseball, and reportedly received 
serious consideration to become Major 
League Baseball Commissioner in 
1950.95  Earl Warren, Jr. recalled that 
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his father might have publicly signaled 
willingness to become Commissioner 
if he had not recently announced his 
candidacy for re-election as Governor 
of California.96  
 The baseball position continued 
to hold Warren’s keen interest until 
President Eisenhower appointed him 
to the Court three years later.97  One 
biographer noted that when the Court 
reaffirmed Major League Baseball’s 
antitrust exemption in Toolson v. New 
York Yankees, Inc. in 1953 on the new 
Chief Justice’s first opinion day,
“[f]ew knew how close Warren had 
come to representing baseball in this 
case, rather than judging it.”98  
 For several years, Chief Justice 
Warren brought the other Justices 
and their wives to Philadelphia for 
the Army-Navy football game.99  He 
rarely missed a Washington Redskins 
home football game, attended as many 
Washington Senators baseball games 
as his schedule permitted, and at-
tended at least one World Series game 
whenever it was played in a city near 
Washington.100  Justice Potter Stewart 
recalled that the Chief Justice would 
come to his chambers “to watch the 
World Series because . . . my secre-
tary had the only television set in the 
building. . . . He was like a little boy 
playing hooky.”101  Messengers would 
deliver World Series scores to the 
Chief Justice and his colleagues dur-
ing oral arguments and in the Court’s 
conferences.102 
 The Warren Commission’s gen-
eral counsel explained how the panel 
would relieve tension-filled days in 
the mid-1960s during its deliberations 
on President Kennedy’s assassination:  
“When they got too bad, the Chief Jus-
tice would break it up by talking about 
other things, baseball, for instance.  He 
was always good for a couple of min-
utes on the pleasure of watching Willie 
Mays catch a fly or the speed of Sandy 
Koufax’s fast ball.”103  
 Chief Justice Warren cheerfully 
explained his unorthodox practice of 
reading the daily newspaper from back 
to front:  “I always turn to the sports 
page first,” he said, because “[t]he 
sports page records people’s accom-
plishments; the front page, nothing but 
man’s failure.”104 
 Since the early 1970s, the prolifera-
tion of sports references in federal and 
state court opinions has reaffirmed 
Chief Justice Warren’s passion for ath-
letics as a reflection of American life. 
The courts have assured a prominent 
place for sports references in written 
advocacy and opinion-writing, but 
advocates and judges would be wise to 
remember Chief Justice Warren’s for-
mula.  In his memoirs, he wrote freely 
about his private passion for base-
ball and other sports, but his official 
writing used sports references care-
fully, and never in a way that would 
compromise the Court’s institutional 
dignity or prestige.105
Much of this two-part article original-
ly appeared in 17 VillanoVa SportS and 
EntErtainmEnt law Journal 1 (2010). 
Reprinted by permission. Fuller notes 
appear in the law Journal article.
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